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Edward Ray, in his comment on my 1976 paper, analyzes a slightly different model than the one I presented,
and thus reaches different conclusions. His principal conclusions are that: (i) given wage rigidities, a wage
subsidy to producers is needed, and this subsidy is equivalent to the optimal static subsidy that ensures full
employment in each sector; and (ii) given the forced equilization of wages across sectors, a subsidy to workers
is needed to encourage labor transfers between sectors. Thus, Ray finds that full employment is always
desirable, whereas I find that some unemployment is (usually) present along the optimum path.
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 Factor-Market Distortions and Dynamic
 Optimal Intervention: Reply
 By HARVEY E. LAPAN*
 Edward Ray, in his comment on my 1976
 paper, analyzes a slightly different model
 than the one I presented, and thus reaches
 different conclusions. His principal conclu-
 sions are that: (i) given wage rigidities, a
 wage subsidy to producers is needed, and this
 subsidy is equivalent to the optimal static
 subsidy that ensures full employment in each
 sector; and (ii) given the forced equilization of
 wages across sectors, a subsidy to workers is
 needed to encourage labor transfers between
 sectors. Thus, Ray finds that full employment
 is always desirable, whereas I find that some
 unemployment is (usually) present along the
 optimum path.
 The differences in our solutions arise from
 the different specifications of our models. Ray
 assumes (his notation):
 (1) DLa = (uml Wa - Wm)Lm
 (2) C= C(DLa) = cost of labor transfer
 Thus, from (1), Ray assumes that the rate of
 labor transfers between sectors depends on
 the unemployment rate in the declining sector
 (urm), and the differential in wages received by
 workers between the two sectors (wa - wm).
 Consequently, (1) represents a behavioral
 relation concerning labor's voluntary decision
 to move between sectors. Furthermore, Ray
 assumes that labor transfers are possible even
 under full employment; i.e., ?(0, wa - wm) >
 O for wa > Wm. Since the return to labor is
 treated as a pure rent (i.e., the labor supply
 decision is not responsive to the wage rate)
 and since Ray assumes that any desired labor
 transfer between sectors can be accomplished
 without unemployment (by properly choosing
 (wa - w)), it immediately follows that full
 employment is always desirable.'
 In order to prevent the optimal long-run
 solution from being obtained costlessly and
 immediately, Ray assumes that the process of
 transferring labor is costly [C = C(DLj)].
 Though this cost function is not explained by
 Ray, the costs obviously do not represent the
 value of output foregone due to (voluntary or
 involuntary) unemployment; rather, these
 costs depend only on the number of workers
 transferred, and not on how the transfer is
 accomplished.
 Thus, the key relationship in Ray's model is
 this cost function, as can be seen from his
 equation (9). The optimal rate of labor trans-
 fer for a centrally planned economy is deter-
 mined from (9), and this optimal solution is
 independent of any distortions that occur
 within the economy. Of course, how this plan
 is supported by prices and subsidies will
 depend upon the types of distortions present,
 but the conclusion that full employment is
 always desirable derives solely from his speci-
 fication of the control model, and not from the
 range of policy options available to planners
 who are attempting to achieve this optimal
 plan.
 In my specification of the control problem
 (1976) it is assumed that some unemployment
 is necessary in order to transfer labor between
 sectors:
 (3) DLa = 0(u)Lm
 Again, (3) does not imply the presence of
 distortions, but rather specifies how transfers
 are accomplished; for example, some search
 may be necessary before new employment is
 obtained. Given (3), the optimal rate of
 unemployment and labor transfer for a
 centrally planned economy is determined; the
 policy needed to support it then depends on
 the types of distortions present. As noted in
 *Professor of economics, Iowa State University.
 'Presumably, the institutional constraint is the forced
 equalizaiton of wages across sectors: w4 = win. However,
 implicitly Ray assumes that those workers who do move
 between sectors can receive an extra subsidy to compen-
 sate them for the extra costs they incur.
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 the comment by James Cassing and Jack
 Ochs and in my reply (1978), this unemploy-
 ment may be voluntary or involuntary; and
 whether private decisions are socially optimal
 depends not only on whether price rigidities
 are present, but also on how private labor
 transfers are made and on whether congestion
 occurs in the search process. It is clear that
 (3) represents the implicit cost of labor trans-
 fer; explicitly, the cost of labor transfer is the
 value of output lost through unemployment:
 (4) C(DLa) = Pm [Fm(Lm) - Fm(Lm(l -u))]
 =Pm [Fm (Lm)-Fm (Lm g(DLa))]
 Dm
 (5) ?(u) = (DLa/Lm); u =Iv1(DLa/Lm);
 (1 - u) =-g(DLa/Lm)
 Thus, the cost of labor transfers that Ray
 postulates can be derived from the assump-
 tion that some unemployment is necessary to
 accomplish labor transfers. Therefore,
 whether any unemployment is desirable
 depends only upon the mechanism by which
 labor is transferred between sectors.
 Finally, how the optimal plan is supported
 depends on the type of distortions present. As
 Cassing-Ochs and I (1978) show, if no wage
 rigidities are present (so that all unemploy-
 ment is voluntary) and if individuals have
 perfect foresight, then private decisions will
 be socially optimal if, and only if, no conges-
 tion occurs in the search process; if congestion
 occurs, then some intervention is needed to
 support the optimal plan. However, if wage
 rigidities are present then, as I argued in my
 earlier paper, a wage subsidy to producers is
 required in order to provide for the optimal
 rate of employment (unemployment) in the
 declining sector. Furthermore, as long as
 some unemployment is required to transfer
 labor, this subsidy will be less than the
 optimal static subsidy, as described in my
 earlier paper. Ray's conclusion that the
 optimal dynamic subsidy to producers is the
 same as the optimal static subsidy does not
 hold if unemployment is required to affect
 transfers.
 Furthermore, if the only private costs of
 search to workers are the wages foregone,
 then all unemployed workers in the declining
 sector (as a result of the dynamic subsidy
 being less than the optimal static subsidy) will
 find it profitable to search for work in the
 other sector, and no additional subsidy to
 workers will be required to support the
 optimal plan.2 Thus, if at the beginning of
 each day, the government announces the
 subsidy for that day, and then the firms tell
 which workers to show up for work, those
 workers who find themselves unemployed will
 choose to search for a job in the other sector.3
 Hence, only the subsidy to producers is
 required to support the optimal plan.
 To conclude, Ray finds that full employ-
 ment is always desirable, and that two subsi-
 dies-one to producers and one to workers-
 are required. His first conclusion differs from
 my conclusion because he uses a different
 model; the specification of the control model,
 and not the presence of distortions, deter-
 mines whether full employment is optimal.
 Regarding his second conclusion, we have
 seen that the policies needed to support the
 optimal plan depend on the types of distor-
 tions present and the way in which the labor
 market functions. For his model, since full
 employment is desirable, his conclusions are
 correct; however, for my specification, only a
 subsidy to producers is needed since the only
 distortion present is the wage rigidity. Finally,
 2This is true since it is assumed that wages received in
 the two sectors are identical. Assume that the worker
 cannot be employed in the more productive sector on the
 first day; if he searches for the day, he has probability
 ?(u) of finding a job there, and hence being employed for
 subsequent days. If there is some positive probability he
 will not get his old job back, then as long as ?(u) > 0
 search is desirable for him. Of course, if the search
 process itself entails costs-above the wages foregone-
 then he may not choose to search. But if this search
 process does entail these costs, they should be included in
 the original control problem.
 30f course, if the workers can only visit one firm per
 day, and if they do not know ex ante whether their old job
 is available for that day, they must decide whether to
 show up for work, hoping to be employed, or whether to
 look for a job elsewhere. In this case, the optimal subsidy
 derived in my original paper will not be sufficient.
 However, note that this specification is not consistent
 with the control model since the latter implictly assumes
 search is needed only to find jobs in the other sector. If
 search is needed in both sectors, the control model must
 be modified (see my 1978 paper, fn. 4).
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 note that both models allow the attainment of
 the first best solution (given the assumption
 that labor mobility is costly), despite the
 presence of distortions. If labor supply deci-
 sions were endogenous, and if wages received
 were required to be the same in each sector,
 then the return to labor would not be a pure
 rent and we would have a true second best
 world.
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